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ABSTRACT
We contribute to the debate over whether forecastable stock returns reflect an
unexploited profit opportunity or rationally reflect risk differentials. We test
whether agents could earn excess returns by selecting stocks which have a low
market price compared to an estimate of the fundamental value obtained from an
econometric model. The criterion for stock picking is one which could actually
have been implemented by agents operating in real time. We show that
statistically significant, and quantitatively substantial, excess returns are delivered
by portfolios of stocks which are cheap relative to our estimate of fundamental
value. There is no evidence that the under priced stocks are relatively risky and
hence excess returns cannot easily be interpreted as an equilibrium compensation
for risk.3
I Introduction
It is now widely accepted that cross-section stock returns can be forecast by the
ratio of the current stock price to a number of accounting variables. For example it
has been shown that returns can be forecast by the ratio of the market value to the
book value of assets, Fama and French (1992), the price dividend ratio, Elton et al
(1983), and the ratio of cash flow to market value of equity, Lakonishok et al
(1994). Even the well known size effect, Banz (1981), falls into this class, since size
is usually measured by stock price multiplied by the number of outstanding
shares. However what remains unsettled is the question of whether the evidence
that price scaled accounting  variables can forecast returns indicates a rejection of
efficient markets. Is this a genuine profit opportunity or do the return differentials
instead rationally reflect risk differences between stocks?
This latter interpretation follows from the fact that risky stocks, which must offer
higher expected returns, will inevitably have relatively low market prices relative
to accounting variables like book value, current dividends, current earnings and
the number of outstanding shares. In the case of the price dividend ratio this
follows immediately from the Gordon growth model. Berk (1996) develops a
formal model which demonstrates that in an efficient market both size and market
to book will be proxies for risk and hence will forecast returns. Fama and French
(1995) report empirical evidence for the efficient markets interpretation by
showing that  fluctuations in book to market are rational since they are correlated
with subsequent earnings growth.
The interpretation that forecastable returns represent an economic profit
opportunity follows from the hypothesis that there are irrational swings in market
sentiment for stocks, see for example Shiller (1984). Although Shiller formulated a
model of aggregate stock mispricing, the ideas easily generalise to individual
stocks. In this model we would expect current accounting variables to serve as a
proxy for fundamental value and hence we can identify under priced stocks as
those with a low price relative to these stocks. Lakonishok et al (1994) develop this
argument and present evidence to suggest that this is indeed the reason why these
price scaled variables have forecasting power. Dechow and Sloan (1997) test a4
corollary of this model by showing that stock prices reflect analysts’ earnings
forecasts which have been shown to be irrational by LaPorta (1995) and Bulkley
and Harris (1996).
The problem that two very different models of stock pricing imply the same
empirical relationships in the data arise because current price is measured relative
to a proxy for the fundamental which is independent of company risk. It is
inevitable in this approach that risky companies will on average appear relatively
under priced. In this paper we attempt to overcome the problem of observational
equivalence by constructing an estimate of the fundamental value which reflects
the risk of the stock. We test whether returns can be forecast by the ratio of current
price, not an  accounting variable, to an estimate of the fundamental value for the
stock price calculated from an econometric model which explicitly allows for risk.
This implies that it is no longer necessarily the case that risky stocks will on
average have a low market price relative to the benchmark.
The fundamental value for a stock is estimated as follows. We assume the
dividend process for individual companies is stationary in first differences. The
present value model then implies that prices and dividends are co-integrated
(Campbell and Shiller (1987)). We estimate the parameters of this cointegrating
regression for each company in our sample. Our estimate of the fundamental stock
price at any date is then obtained by substituting the stock’s current dividend into
the estimated co-integrating regression. Intuitively, co-integration means that in
the long run there is a stable relationship between the dividend and the stock price
for each company. Substituting the current dividend into the co-integrating
relationship gives what one might informally describe as the stock price which
one would expect to see in the long-run for that company, conditional on the
current dividend.
The reason that the stock’s risk premium is reflected in our measure of
fundamental value is that stocks with high required rates of return will have on
average a low price relative to their dividend. This will be captured in the
parameters of the co-integrating regression, as shown in the next section. Thus our
estimate of fundamental value, obtained from this co-integrating regression, will
reflect the risk adjusted discount rate which the market is actually observed to
apply to each stock over the sample period. There is therefore no need to assume a
particular model of risk pricing. All that needs to be assumed is that however risk
is measured and priced, the relative risk of a company is fixed within the sample5
period. It is possible for both the risk free rate and the average equity risk
premium to be time varying, since these aggregate fluctuations will not affect the
relative ranking of stocks using our mispricing measure. There is thus no reason to
expect that risky stocks will necessarily appear on our criterion and therefore if
under priced stocks are found to deliver higher returns this cannot so easily be
explained away as an equilibrium compensation for risk.
This technique for identifying under priced stocks may be compared to the
conventional criterion of the current dividend yield. This latter approach tests for
excess returns on portfolios of stocks which have a high dividend yield relative to
other stocks at the same date. Our approach will tend to select stocks which have a
high yield not relative to other stocks but relative to their own past dividend yield.
Our method is not exactly that, because we allow for a constant in the relationship
between prices and dividends, but this description gives the comparative flavour
of the two approaches.
In discussing returns forecasting it is important to ensure that the explanatory
variables are public information at the beginning of the period over which returns
are measured. We use a measure of fundamental value obtained from a co-
integrating regression which is estimated using only the data available up to that
same date that the forecast is made. In this way we are testing for the existence of
a profitable trading rule which could have actually been employed by agents
trading in real time. The same could not be said if the measure of the fundamental
were obtained from a co-integrating regression where the parameters were
estimated with the econometrician’s benefit of hindsight of the whole data series.
Our approach implies that the implicit discount rate used to price a stock is the
historic average which has implicitly been applied to it.
We work with a sample of stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange and test
whether portfolios of the “under priced” stocks selected on the above criterion
deliver excess returns over a one to ten year time horizon. There are two reasons
for working with such a long returns period. First is the prior, which is confirmed
in the results, that mispricing, which is the source of excess returns, is eliminated
over years rather than months. Secondly, this long horizon allows us to study the
whole life cycle of mispricing and thus relate our results to the evidence of
negative serial correlation in long term returns reported by DeBondt and Thaler
(1985).8
In an efficient market price will differ from the co-integrating price as a
consequence of rationally forecast temporary differences between dividend
growth in the short-run and its long-run value, measured by the third term on the
right hand side of (4). But this difference is public information and hence cannot
forecast returns. Under the alternative hypothesis the fad will be an additional
term on the right hand side of (7). The ratio of market price to co-integrating price
will then be a measure of the fad or stock mispricing and hence should forecast
returns if mispricing is temporary.
III Data and Results
Data on prices, dividends, Beta, and size were taken from CRSP (Centre for
Research in Security Prices, University of Chicago). The dividend yield is
measured by the total annual dividend payment in the calendar year ending
December 31st divided by the stock price on December 31st. Size is market
capitalisation measured in $10m. The co-integrating regressions are estimated
using a price and dividend series for each stock which is adjusted for all forms of
capital re-organisations, for example stock splits, using data provided by CRSP
(coded FACPR).
The sample of companies studied in any year is all those which have been
continuously listed on the New York Stock Exchange from December 1945 to that
same date and paid dividends in at least 10 of these years. This sample choice
reflects a trade-off between the number of companies included in the sample and
the length of data available on each to estimate the co-integrating regression. The
earlier the start date the more degrees of freedom for estimating the regression but
the fewer the number of companies. We also wanted a “natural” definition of the
sample to avoid a suspicion that the results were obtained by data mining. This
suggested a start date of either December 1925, the beginning of data collected by
CRSP, or beginning after World War II. Choosing the latter gives a much larger
sample of firms, and still allows portfolios to be constructed at twenty three
different dates and returns traced over a decade. We judged this to be preferable
to estimating the co-integrating regression on a longer data set for those
companies which were included , but working with the much smaller sample of
companies. The final sample consisted of 580 firms in 1960, which had fallen to
432 in 1970, and 348 in 1980.9
In view of the large number of companies, and data sets of different spans, we do
not report test statistics for the time series properties of the individual dividend
series, or for the company co-integrating regressions. The assumption that for the
typical firm dividends are first difference stationary and that prices and dividends
are co-integrated is a necessary condition for our procedure to successfully
identify under priced stocks on average. Of course we will always make some
mistakes in identifying “under priced” stocks and one reason for this may be that
these assumptions are false for some companies. The critical issue is whether there
is systematic mispricing which can be profitably identified by a strategy which
requires these assumptions to be satisfied for the average company.
We measure mispricing by the ratio of current market price to the estimated
fundamental price. We work with the ratio rather than the absolute difference
between the two, because of the substantial variation across companies in the
absolute size of their stock prices. All stocks are ranked by this ratio each year and
then are assigned to Decile portfolios. The top and bottom Deciles are sub-divided
into two. All companies in a particular portfolio are initially given equal
weighting and thereafter there is no rebalancing of portfolios. Cumulative returns
for individual stocks are calculated assuming dividends are re-invested in the
same stock. Cumulative portfolio returns are the average of the cumulative
returns of the individual stocks. Returns are everywhere real returns.
There is no problem of survivorship bias since we trace returns on all companies
irrespective of their survival history after the sample selection year. In the case
where companies disappeared from the data set for any reason, for example
bankruptcy or merger, we assume any final payments to stockholders are
reinvested in the same portfolio in the same proportions as the remaining
companies occupy at that date.
We first report returns on five portfolios consisting of the full sample of firms, FS;
the 5% most under-valued firms, UN1; the next 5% most under-valued firms,
UN2; the 5% most over-valued firms, OV1; and the next 5% most over-valued,
OV2. Portfolios are constructed, giving equal weight to all companies, for twenty
three dates starting December 31st 1960 and then annually on the same date until
December 31st 1982. For each of these twenty three start dates, the returns on
portfolios were calculated for the subsequent decade. In Table 1 we report the10
average returns across the twenty three start dates, the returns are calculated for
the subsequent decade.
In Table I it can be seen that on average the UN1 and UN2 portfolios both beat the
full sample for all horizons, and UN1 also beats UN2 for all horizons. The
expected excess returns are substantial. For example, the UN1 portfolio delivers
an average cumulative excess return of 36.1% over five years, compared to the full
sample. The UN1 portfolio beats the OV1 portfolio on average by 45.7%
cumulative over five years, or approximately 9% per annum for five consecutive
years.
Both of the over-valued portfolios, OV1 and OV2, on average under-perform the
under-valued portfolios for all horizons. They also under-perform the full sample
average for all horizons, except the first year in the case of OV1. The one
somewhat surprising result is that OV1 delivers higher returns than OV2 for the
first six years. We conjectured that this might be a result of the fact that the most
over-valued portfolio contained a very large number of zero dividend companies.
It is often argued that zero dividends are a signal of financial distress so that the
well documented fact that zero dividend companies deliver higher returns,
Christie (1990), can be explained as a risk premium. We therefore repeated the
whole exercise omitting any companies which paid no dividend in the twelve
months preceding the date of portfolio formation. The results of this exercise are
reported in Table II.
In Table II it can be seen that OV1 now under-performs OV2 so that the relative
performance of all four portfolios is consistent with our mispricing measure
monotonically forecasting returns. The deletion of zero-dividend companies
increases the relative over-performance of the most under-valued portfolio
compared to the most over-valued. Over 5 years the cumulative differential
between the two portfolios is now 57.2%. If it is correct that zero dividends signal
temporary distress and therefore command a risk premium, then we might
conclude that the appropriate risk adjusted excess return comparison between
OV1 and UN1 should be based on the sample which excludes zero dividend
companies.
Tracing returns for a decade contributes evidence on the long run life cycle of
mispricing and allows us to relate our results to the work which has reported
negative serial correlation in long run returns, for example DeBondt and Thaler11
(1985). In order to focus on the life cycle of returns we report in Table III average
incremental returns from holding each portfolio for more than one year. Table III
reports results for the full sample including zero dividend companies. The
evidence in Table III is consistent with, but suggests a qualification to, the
evidence reported by DeBondt and Thaler that performance over a five year
horizon is negatively correlated with subsequent returns. It is consistent in that an
overvalued stock must have previously delivered high returns in the course of
becoming over-valued and in this case high past returns will be followed by low
subsequent returns. However high returns which are the result of the unwinding
of of earlier underpricing are not usually followed by unusually low returns. It
can be seen in Table III that an undervalued portfolio, which consistently delivers
substantial excess returns over a five year horizon, performs marginally better
than the full sample over the following five years, with a small cumulative excess
return of only 4.9%. Five years over performance is followed by five years of
approximately average returns. This implies that the underlying factor which
explains excess returns is not underperformance in the past but underpricing in
the present. Past underperformance is an imperfect proxy for current under
valuation.
Table III also highlights an interesting asymmetry in the time profile of the excess
returns for under and over-valued portfolios. The UN1 portfolio delivers a
cumulative excess return of 31.6% over the first five years. On the other hand the
5% most over-valued portfolio, OV1, only under-performs in the first five years by
a cumulative 9.6%, (or 18.1% when zero dividend companies are deleted).
However, in the second half of the decade it under-performs the full sample by a
cumulative 30.3%, with particularly pronounced under-performance in the last
three years of the decade, as can be seen from Table II. This suggests that the stock
market is quicker at identifying under-valued stocks and returning them to their
fundamental value, the source of the excess return, than it is at recognising that
glamour stocks have been over-valued.
A further perspective on the difference in performance over the decade of the 5%
most under-valued  and 5% most over-valued portfolios is provided by the serial
correlation in our mispricing measure. The average probability of a company
which was in OV1 one year re-appearing OV1 in the following year was 43.5%.
Mispricing is highly persistent, both for over and under-valued shares. However,
the persistence of over valuation is rather greater than that of under-valuation.
This is consistent with the evidence in Table III which we surveyed in the12
preceding paragraph. The greater persistence of over valuation means that the
negative excess returns associated with it are less in the short run. Both the
persistence evidence and excess returns evidence imply that under-valued stocks
bounce back to fundamental values more quickly than glamour stocks are exposed
for their true worth. The market is quicker to spot a bargain than it is to lose faith
in a favourite.
On our best estimate it is possible to earn substantial profits using this trading
rule. We turn next to the question of whether these profits are statistically
significant. We start with a non-parametric test, which places no restrictions on the
underlying distributions, the Sign Test. Under the efficient markets hypothesis
t i t i P P , , ˆ  is in the agent’s information set and hence the probability of any portfolio
selected on this criterion beating any other is 0.5. In Table IV we report the
number of times the portfolio of the 5% most under-valued shares delivered
higher returns than the portfolio consisting of the 5% most over-valued shares
over horizons of one to ten years. In our sample size of 23, the probability in a one
sided test of 16 successes is 5%, of 17 successes is 2.5%, of 18 is 1%, with 1/2 %
probability of 19 successes. We can reject the null hypothesis that our criterion
does not forecast returns at the 95% significance level for holding periods of two
years or more.
We next report regression results. We regress returns on the ratio of market price
to theoretical stock price. We argued above that this ratio should not be correlated
with the risk of the stock providing firm risk is constant over time. If this
assumption is valid then a properly specified returns regression requires that we
also include regressors which explicitly capture risk. We use three variables to
measure risk. Under CAPM it is covariance with the market, i.e. Beta, which
should measure risk, and this is the first variable which we include. However,
there is now widespread doubt about the validity of this model, see for example
Fama and French (1992). Fama and French, amongst many others, show that
market capitalisation is important in explaining cross-section returns. Berk (1995)
shows why size will serve as a risk measure. Finally, we include dividend yield as
a measure of risk. Ball (1978) argued that dividend yield should serve as a “catch-
all” measure of risk in an efficient  market. Even if the researcher has not assumed
the correct model of risk pricing then the variance in total returns due to risk will
be proxied by the dividend yield, since the  dividend yield is a component of the
total return. The only assumption required for this argument is that if dividends15
The excess returns on the under priced portfolios appear to be both large and
statistically significant. However, it might yet be argued that the above
assumption, that companies’ perceived relative risk at any time is the historic
average up to that date in the sample, is invalid. In this case stocks which are of
temporarily high risk will appear under priced. One answer to this is that in the
above regression we controlled for risk using contemporaneously measured size,
dividend yield and Beta measured over the previous five years. Another
perspective is provided by looking at the average value of size and Beta for the
under and over-valued portfolios and these statistics are reported in Table VI.
It can be seen in Table VI that although the average value of Beta for the 5% most
under-valued portfolio is larger than for the 5% most over-valued, the size of the
difference does not seem large enough to account for all of the excess return. If the
equity premium over the safe rate of interest is taken to be the historic average of
approximately 8%, then the difference in Beta between UN1 and OV1 requires a
yield difference under CAPM of only 1.4% per annum against the average
measured difference of approximately 9% per annum over the first 5 years.
Furthermore the average value of Beta for UN2 is less than for OV1, and yet on
average for every horizon UN2 beats OV1.
The average company size in both of the under-valued portfolios is greater than in
both of the over-valued portfolios. Since there is overwhelming evidence, Banz
(1981), Fama and French (1992), that on average smaller companies deliver higher
returns it is striking that UN1 and UN2 both beat OV1 and OV2, despite the fact
that the latter are comprised on average of significantly smaller companies.
However many measures of risk we report it can still be argued that excess
returns may be rationalised by some other model of risk. An alternative approach
is to not focus on ex ante risk measures but to examine instead whether as a
matter of fact the under priced shares were, when combined into portfolios, riskier
ex post. That is rather than comparing just the mean of the resulting returns
distribution for under-priced/over-priced portfolios, as in the previous section,
we compare the whole distributions. We report results on the whole distribution
of returns for three and five year returns in Table VII and Table VIII.
We test whether a risk-averse individual would strictly prefer the distribution of
returns from the under priced portfolio to the distribution of returns from the over
priced portfolio. The general criterion which requires no restriction on the16
distribution functions or investor’s utility functions, other than they are not risk-
loving, is the criterion of second order stochastic dominance (SSD). A probability
density function, f, is said to exhibit SSD over a density g if:
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with strict inequality for some  y . F  and G  denote cumulative density functions
for f and g  respectively.
If f  exhibits SSD with respect to g, then f is preferred to g by all risk-averters. See
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1972).
Using this criterion we compute the distribution of returns on the 5% most over-
valued portfolio with the 5% most under-valued portfolio. We evaluate these
distributions for 3 and 5 year returns. To do this we need to approximate the true
continuous distribution by our discrete observations. For each return horizon
there are 23 distinct observations for each portfolio, each occurring with frequency
1/23. We denote a particular observation by  i x , and first rank the data from Table
VII and  Table VIII in ascending order.  ( ) i x F  is obtained by summing the sample
frequencies for  j x ,  i j £ . We found that for both the 3 and 5 years return horizons
the decile of most under-valued shares exhibited second order stochastic
dominance over the  decile portfolio of most over-valued shares. Indeed for five
year returns the under valued stocks only fail to exhibit first order stochastic
dominance by a tiny margin. It can be seen from Table VIII that for every start
date the five year returns of the most under-valued decile were greater than the
five-year returns on the most over-valued decile, with the trivial exception of 1964
where the cumulative difference between the two was 0.3% over 5 years. In order
to interpret the dominance of our under priced portfolios over five years as
consistent with rational asset pricing theory one would have to argue that the
excess return on the under priced stocks reflected a stronger positive covariance
with shocks to aggregate wealth of a kind that was not observed in over thirty
years.
It is particularly interesting to see the relative protection offered by the under and
over priced portfolios to crashes. The largest annual fall in our sample, with
average twelve month returns of –29.7%, was in 1974. In all cases which overlap
this period the most under valued portfolio 5 year returns can still beat the most17
over valued portfolio. In the case of 3 year returns the under priced portfolio
bought in December 1971 lost, by the end of 1974, 41.6% against a loss of 48.1% on
the corresponding over priced portfolio. In the case of five year returns the under
priced portfolio bought in December 1969 lost, by the end of 1974, 34.2% against a
loss of 49.7% On the corresponding over-priced portfolio.
We conclude that it seems hard to account for the profits delivered by the trading
rule as equilibrium rewards to holding riskier stocks.
V Summary and Conclusions
We found support for the hypothesis that there is a component of forecastable
stock returns which is driven by irrational swings of market sentiment. We
employed a number of distinct approaches to the question of whether the returns
forecastability we uncovered could be rationalised as an equilibrium reward to
risk. Firstly, and most importantly, we worked with a benchmark price ratio
which did not imply that risky shares would necessarily appear under priced,
unlike those price scaled accounting variables which have previously been shown
to forecast returns. Secondly we used a number of approaches to evaluate whether
the portfolios of stocks which appear under priced were more risky. Each
approach gave the same negative answer. Taking all the evidence we have
reported together suggests that one would have to have a very strong prior belief
in efficient markets to argue that the stock picking rule which we have tested does
not generate economic profits
Furthermore the mispricing measure which we employed could have been used to
earn excess returns by market participants trading in real calendar time. We
conditioned stock selection strictly on an econometric model which was estimated
using only data which would have been currently available to market participants
at the trading date. The mispricing could have been exploited by rational investors
who buy which are temporarily out of fashion and avoid over priced glamour
stocks, thereby earning economic excess returns compared to the market portfolio.
Our results provide a framework in which the evidence of negative serial
correlation in long run returns reported by DeBondt and Thaler (1985) can be
interpreted. Undervalued stocks must have delivered negative returns in the
course of becoming undervalued and hence the use of past returns will be a proxy18
for a direct measure of current mispricing. However it is an imperfect proxy since
we showed that excess returns which resulted from the unravelling of earlier
mispricing were not correlated with subsequent returns.
An interesting extension of this work would be to try to find variables to explain
the mispricing of equities, as measured by  t i t i P P , , ˆ .
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5 10.5 13.6 12.3 10.4 11.1
6 9.1 8.4 9.2 9.2 8.3
7 9.8 10.5 10.3 10.8 5.7
8 7.6 10.8 9.7 5.6 1.1
9 7.2 9.1 10.6 5.5 0.7
10 8.7 6.7 10.8 5.5 2.5
N.B. Incremental Returns from year 5 to year 10 =54.6 on UN1
     = 49.7 on FS
     =19.4 on OV1
Table IV












13 16 17 18 22 23 20 21 22 2226
1960 177.0 116.0 134.2 101.9 103.3 100.0 97.8 86.3 90.3 92.8
1961 51.9 59.9 59.1 40.0 38.3 35.1 37.0 37.3 54.0 32.3
1962 184.2 130.9 138.5 117.7 114.7 133.6 115.6 103.4 115.5 150.9
1963 171.2 151.4 116.6 86.6 107.0 133.9 153.9 133.2 163.2 154.6
1964 70.2 63.6 36.6 57.2 46.9 32.6 61.3 62.1 81.7 70.5
1965 26.2 15.9 13.5 16.4 34.9 19.4 54.1 5.6 7.9 0.4
1966 86.8 47.8 50.0 44.8 61.2 67.4 47.3 28.0 64.1 28.9
1967 14.1 32.2 23.8 27.0 20.7 18.7 8.4 15.0 5.9 -21.7
1968 -24.3 -15.9 -21.6 -15.5 -17.1 -37.8 -16.3 -32.6 -39.2 -51.4
1969 -34.2 -34.7 -33.7 -31.4 -34.7 -33.7 -24.0 -36.5 -56.1 -49.7
1970 -6.8 -11.4 -17.8 -7.9 -19.3 -16.4 -12.6 -11.7 -14.6 -8.3
1971 16.5 0.6 10.1 11.9 5.2 -0.8 -16.3 3.2 2.4 -16.0
1972 0.1 -5.3 -4.3 -9.1 -1.4 -8.9 3.4 -22.2 -16.5 -10.7
1973 71.4 48.6 40.8 37.7 34.0 42.4 17.9 -10.2 -13.7 -14.7
1974 169.8 146.4 142.4 103.1 85.0 84.5 97.8 84.4 85.6 74.1
1975 98.8 71.5 77.8 67.5 82.1 77.6 47.0 44.1 52.2 62.1
1976 26.1 22.2 9.5 6.2 28.0 16.3 16.2 29.9 16.7 23.6
1977 73.1 34.5 23.7 62.6 41.9 57.1 27.3 23.6 69.0 57.1
1978 120.0 56.9 87.1 105.0 64.0 91.9 101.4 91.4 88.8 97.8
1979 107.6 68.0 70.1 71.0 35.8 73.1 51.3 53.9 56.5 37.5
1980 156.8 144.7 148.6 101.5 88.3 89.8 96.0 47.3 34.2 54.9
1981 208.8 193.5 179.4 186.7 142.0 126.9 90.0 127.8 102.3 99.8
1982 117.3 148.6 161.7 155.6 148.9 125.7 101.9 123.5 111.9 114.2